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CONDEMNATION BLIGHT, DE FACTO TAKING
AND ABANDONMENT IN RELIANCE-
COMPENSATION OF LOSSES IN
URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Compensation for property taken for eminent domain purposes
within an urban redevelopment area depends upon many unique
valuation factors. Property value losses attributable to city planning
activity may be considered in computing an award. In City of Buffalo
v. J. TV. Clement Company," no de facto taking was found, but deval-
uation flowing from the city's threat of condemnation was compen-
sated.
In 1954, officials of the Buffalo Redevelopment Project first advised
Clement that part of the company's extensive printing facilities were
located within the area tentatively designated for urban renewal
appropriation. Subsequent "official" statements significantly affected
Clement's decision to relocate. Early in 1963, the city scheduled the
purchase for May. In good faith reliance, Clement completed its
move to the new location by April 1, 1963. Acquisition did not occur
as planned and the property could be neither sold nor rented after
1963. As legal owner, Clement continued to bear the cost of taxes,
insurance and maintenance until title vested in the city by judicial
proceedings in 1968.
Clement sought relief under a theory of de facto taking, asserting
effective city ownership of the property as of 1963. The company's
compensation under that claim might have included the market value
of the property at the date of alleged taking,2 interest on the market
value award from 19633 and proprietary expenses paid by Clement
after 1963. The appellate division affirmed the trial court's finding
of a taking of the property as of April 1, 1963. The court declared
that the city's acts, such as threat of condemnation, established a de
1. 28 N.Y.2d 241, 269 N.E.2d 895, 321 N.Y.S.2d 345 (1971).
2. United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946); In re
Board of Water Supply, 277 N.Y. 452, 456, 14 N.E.2d 789, 791 (1938).
3. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13, 17-18 (1933); In re Bronx River
Parkway, 284 N.Y. 48, 54-55, 29 N.E.2d 465, 468 (1940), aff'd per curiam. sub
nom. A.F. & G. Realty Corp. v. City of New York, 313 U.S. 540 (1940).
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facto taking "inasmuch as the City's acts forced Clement to move
from its property at that time... ."4 The New York Court of Appeals
expressly rejected the lower courts' findings of a de facto taking and
adhered to the traditional definitions that such acquisitions are con-
fined to situations "involving a direct invasion of the condemnee's
property or a direct legal restraint on its use. ... "I'
When a proper legal proceeding establishes a taking,7 compensa-
tion must be granted.8 The fundamental consideration in compen-
sating, according to the Clement court, is that the award must be
"just" both to the owner whose property is taken and to the tax-
paying public which pays for the taking.9 Two theories of compen-
sation were considered in Clement: de facto taking (as to loss of use)
and "condemnation blight" (as to loss of value).
When a de facto taking is declared to have occurred before formal
appropriation, compensation for the value of the property at the
earlier date is awarded with interest. In essence, such a taking
advances the recognition of acquisition from the date of the formal
proceedings to the date of the actual appropriation. The certainty
which the law demands militates against finding a taking for claims
predicated on subjective decisions. Even though an abandonment
may have been induced, no taking occurs when an owner relin-
quishes his property due to a threat of condemnation.1o Abandon-
ment may be argued to be unnecessary absent legal compulsion.
The city never compelled Clement to relinquish its use of the
property until the 1968 condemnation trial, although the threat of
4. City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 24, 31-32, 311
N.Y.S.2d 98, 106 (1970).
5. Keystone Associates v. Moerdler, 19 N.Y.2d 78, 88, 224 N.E.2d 700, 703,
278 N.Y.S.2d 185, 189 (1966); Forster v. Scott, 136 N.Y. 577, 584, 32 N.E. 976,
977 (1893); Selig v. State, 20 Misc. 2d 33, 37, 194 N.Y.S.2d 833, 837 (Ct. Cl.
1959). See also 2 P. NIcHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 6.2 (3d ed. 1950) [herein-
after cited as NICHOLS].
6. 28 N.Y.2d at 253, 269 N.E.2d at 902, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
7. See, e.g., N.Y. CONDEM. LAw art. 2 (McKinney 1950).
8. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 7 (McKinney 1950).
9. Searl v. School Dist. No. 2, 133 U.S. 553, 562 (1889), cited in New York
0. & W.R. Co. v. Livingston, 238 N.Y. 300, 306, 144 N.E. 589, 591 (1924), and
in City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 28 N.Y.2d at 255, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321
N.Y.S.2d at 357.
10. Hempstead Warehouse Corp. v. United States, 98 F. Supp. 572, 573 (Ct.
Cl. 1951); 2 NICHOLS § 6.1(1). See also Danforth v. United States, 308 U.S.
271, 283-86 (1939); United States v. Sponenbarger, 308 U.S. 256, 267 (1939).
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condemnation strongly suggested reliance and pragmatic relocation
in 1963. Clement's claim flowed from the theory of a 1963 taking,
but since the court of appeals found no taking at that date, relief
under that theory was necessarily denied.
An award for condemnation blight compensates a property owner
for the devaluation caused by the condemning authority's "affirma-
tive value-depressing acts"11 such as a threat of condemnation.
Clement illustrates how the announcement of a redevelopment proj-
ect and the likelihood of condemnation can lead to a drastic reduc-
tion of property values in the affected area. The governmental pre-
rogative of eminent domain can preclude private use of land,
rendering it virtually valueless at market. The court of appeals
remanded Clement for a determination of the extent of condemna-
tion blight and directed that such an award be made.
Fundamentally, the question of compensation for condemnation
blight devaluation is whether or not a particular loss was "caused"
by a government project.1 2 Jurisdictions differ in their treatment of
property devaluation arising after the announcement of a government
project and before the condemnation trial.
The stricter rule is that market value is assessed at the date of tak-
ing, i.e., at the time of the condemnation proceedings.3 The only
compensation permitted is the depressed market value. If devaluation
occurred before the legal transfer of title it was simply an injury
"necessarily incident to the ownership of property within a munici-
pality possessing the power of eminent domain, which may indirectly
impair its value but for which the law does not and never has
afforded relief."1' Under this approach, government activity is but
11. 28 N.Y.2d at 258, 269 N.E.2d at 905, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 359, citing City of
Buffalo v. George Irish Paper Co., 31 App. Div. 2d 470, 476, 299 N.Y.S.2d 8,
14 (1969), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 869, 258 N.E.2d 100, 309 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1970). See
also City of Detroit v. Cassese, 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965); 4
NicHOLS § 12.3151.
12. Glaves, Date of Valuation in Eminent Domain, 30 U. Cmi. L. Rav. 319,
340 (1963).
13. Weintraub v. Flood Control Dist., 104 Ariz. 566, 456 P.2d 936 (1969);
Housing Authority v. Schroeder, 222 Ga. 417, 151 S.E.2d 226 (1966); Chicago
Housing Authority v. Lamar, 21 Ill. 2d 362, 172 N.E.2d 790 (1961); Land
Clearance for Redev. Authority v. Morrison, 457 S.W.2d 185 (Mo. 1970); Sor-
bino v. City of New Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super. 554, 129 A.2d 473 (Law Div.
1957); Houston v. Biggers, 380 S.W.2d 700 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964).
14. Eckhoff v. Forest Preserve Dist., 377 Ill. 208, 212, 36 N.E.2d 245, 247
(1941); accord, Sorbino v. City of New Brunswick, 43 N.J. Super. 554, 129 A.2d
473 (Law Div. 1957).
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one of the "myriad influences" on the market value.15 States which
follow the strict rule, therefore, deny liability for a correlation
between the appropriation process and any property devaluation
which might occur.
Alternatively, two Supreme Court cases indicate the more liberal
view and establish the federal rule. In United States v. Miller's an
area was specified for government acquisition and some of the land
was condemned. The remaining property then increased in value
due to speculation "as to what the Government would be compelled
to pay as compensation."17 When condemnation did occur, the
enhancement in value attributable to the project was excluded from
the just compensation award in the interest of fairness to the con-
demnor. Conversely, in United States v. Virginia Electric & Power
Co.,' s the Court cited Miller as authority for the proposition that an
award "must exclude any depreciation in value caused by the
prospective taking once the Government 'was committed' to the
project."'19 The opinion continued by quoting one writer's observa-
tion that
'[i]t would be manifestly unjust to permit a public authority to
depreciate property values by a threat... [of the construction of
a government project] and then to take advantage of this depres-
sion in the price which it must pay for the property' when even-
tually condemned.20
Accordingly, many jurisdictions do not consider value fluctuations
caused by the announcement of a government project.2' The effect of
15. United States v. Certain Lands, 47 F. Supp. 934 (D.C.N.Y. 1942).
16. 317 U.S. 369 (1942).
17. Id. at 377.
18. 365 U.S. 624 (1961).
19. Id. at 636.
20. Id., citing 1 L. ORGEL, VALUATiON UNDER EMINENT DOMAIN 447 (2d ed.
1953). See also 2 J. LEwIs, EMINENT DOMAIN 1329 (3d ed. 1909).
21. State Road Dep't. v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1963); Indiana v.
Sovich, 252 N.E.2d 582 (Ind. 1969); Tharp v. Urban Renewal & Community
Dev. Agency, 389 S.W.2d 453 (Ky. 1965); Congressional School of Aeronautics,
Inc. v. State Roads Comm'n, 218 Md. 236, 146 A.2d 558 (1958); Lipinski v.
Lynn Redev. Authority, 355 Mass. 550, 246 N.E.2d 429 (1969); Housing &
Redev. Authority v. Minneapolis Metropolitan Co., 273 Minn. 256, 141 N.W.2d
130 (1966); Brainerd v. New York, 74 Misc. 100, 131 N.Y.S. 221 (Ct. Cl.
1911); Cleveland v. Carcione, 118 Ohio App. 525, 190 N.E.2d 52 (Ct. App.
1963). See also In re Appropriation of Property of Bunner, 28 Ohio Misc. 165,
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the proposed activity on the market value is eliminated by compen-
sating to the extent of the property's fair market value just before
the value-affecting announcement.2 1 The reason for the rule is that
"the landowner is not to be penalized for any depreciation in value
attributable to the public's learning of the condemnation, nor is the
condemnor to be required to pay for any enhancement in values
which may be attributable to the proposed project."2 3 The court of
appeals in Clement recognized municipal liability for condemnation
blight, maintaining New York as one of the liberal compensation
jurisdictions.
Those courts granting blight compensation view compensable
effects conservatively, however, to the detriment of property owners.24
An award for condemnation blight is restricted to devaluation in the
property's fair market value25 and does not include compensation for
interest on the award from the time that the blight began.2 6 To avoid
171, 276 N.E.2d 677, 681-82 (Prob. 1971); 4 NICHOLS § 12.3151; Comment, Re-
covery for Enhancement and Blight in California, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 622, 643-49
(1969); Committee on Condemnation Law, Draft of Model Eminent Domain
Code, 2 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 365 (1967):
Sec. 604 Effect of Imminence of Condemnation
Any change in the fair market value [of real estate] prior to the date of
condemnation which the condemnor or condemnee establishes was substan-
tially due to the general knowledge of the imminence of condemnation, other
than that due to physical deterioration of the property within the reasonable
control of the condemnee, shall be disregarded in determining fair market
'.ale.
Id. at 381.
22. State Road Dep't v. Chicone, 158 So. 2d 753, 758 (Fla. 1963).
23. Tharp v. Urban Renewal & Community Dev. Agency, 389 S.W.2d 453,
456 (Ky. 1965).
24. Glaves, supra note 12.
25. 4 NICHOLS § 12.3151[5]. See also United States ex rel. Tennessee Valley
Authority v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266 (1943):
It is a well-settled rule that while it is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain,
which is the measure of compensation for the property taken . . . not all
losses suffered by the owner are compensable under the Fifth Amendment.
In the absence of a statutory mandate . . . the sovereign must pay only for
what it takes, not for the opportunities which the owner may lose.
Id. at 281-82; Niagara Frontier Bldg. Corp. v. New York, 33 App. Div. 2d 130,
305 N.Y.S.2d 549 (1969), aff'd, 28 N.Y.2d 755, 269 N.E.2d 912, 321 N.Y.S.2d
368 (1971).
26. The significance of the court's refusal to find a 1963 de facto taking is
demonstrated, in part, by reference to the amount of interest to be awarded
Clement on the value of the property. Interest is proportional to the time of
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some of the restrictions on compensation, a complainant might con-
tend that a de facto taking had occurred at the time condemnation
blight began to adversely affect the subject property and that it
deprived him of the use of the property. The taking approach was
unsuccessful in Clement.
Therefore, the issue in jurisdictions granting condemnation blight
awards is to determine when a "taking" occurs. Can the date on
which condemnation blight begins (or is aggravated substantially by
governmental action) establish a date of de facto taking or does the
date of the condemnation trial invariably establish the formal taking
date as being some time after the condemnation blight began (unless
there is municipal legal interference)? Under the latter view, the
date on which condemnation blight began is significant only in estab-
lishing the date of valuation for compensation purposes.
The Clement opinion indicates that New York, following the
traditional rule, will recognize a de facto taking only in those limited
situations
involving a direct invasion of the condemnee's property or a
direct legal restraint on its use .... It is our view that only the
most obvious injustice compels such a result. The Appellate
Division, discerning so substantial an interference with the use
of the subject property, found the essential elements of owner-
ship to have been destroyed and held that the city's action con-
stituted a de facto taking. We firmly disagree with that deter.
mination.2 (Emphasis added.)
The court reiterated that a de facto appropriation requires "a
legal interference with the physical use, possession or enjoyment of
the property or a legal interference with the owner's power of dis-
position of the property." 28 The court's reference to legal inter-
ference is most significant: Clement's relocation was induced by rep-
resentations of future condemnation made merely by various officials
rather than authoritatively by a court. Evidently, in the opinion of
the New York Court of Appeals, this situation was not an "obvious
injustice" which would have required the finding of a taking.
taking, so had the taking been declared as of 1963, the interest would have been
over $400,000 greater than the amount granted for a 1968 taking. 28 N.Y.2d at
254-55, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 356-57.
27. Id. at 253-54, 269 N.H.2d at 902, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
28. Id. at 255, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 357 (emphasis added).
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On similar facts, however, other jurisdictions have found a taking
to have occurred. City of Detroit v. Cassese29 involved a situation
where, in 1950, the city began a condemnation project, informed
persons in the area of the plans, filed a lis pendens, then ten years
later abandoned the project, only to begin another action in 1962.
The property owner sought compensation for a 1950 taking, and the
Michigan Supreme Court agreed that it was due since
many of the acts alleged by appellant, if so performed,--such as
sending letters to tenants ["causing" them to move], filing lis
pendens, intense building department inspection and citations
against owners for any violations of the building code, and,
finally, refusal to permit a long-established business to continue
in a building because it was going to be condemned... would
constitute a taking.30
The court's language would suggest that several of the governmental
acts on the list would be sufficient to constitute a taking.
The Cassese case is distinguished from Clement based on the
former's allegation of "'[r]efusal by governmental agencies to permit
long established licensed businesses to continue in the same building
while awaiting the condemnation trial.' "3 The Clement court proba-
bly would have found a de facto taking had Clement been subjected to
such treatment, in that forced relocation would be a legal interference
with the property owner's prerogatives. 32
Part of the reason for finding a de facto taking only when there
has been a legal interference is to facilitate the administration of con-
demnations and to establish dearly the amount of condemnation
awards. When a court declares that a taking occurs only when there
29. 376 Mich. 311, 136 N.W.2d 896 (1965).
30. Id. at 318, 136 N.W.2d at 900. The court phrases the formula for com-
pensating a de facto taking as follows:
First, the date of taking should be determined. Next, the value of the prop-
erty as of that date is to be ascertained. There should be deducted from the
award any amounts that accrued to the owner from his possession of the
property or that reflect the value of its use following the taking. In [Cassese]
this would consist of the rentals . . . less any expenses in connection with
maintenance, upkeep or repossession, of the properties, such as water and
light bills, insurance, taxes, etc. Finally, interest should be added from the
date of taking to the date of award.
Id. See In re Petition of State Highway Comm'r, 279 Mich. 285, 296, 271
N.W. 760, 764 (1937).
31. 376 Mich. at 317, 136 N.W.2d at 900.
32. 28 N.Y.2d at 255, 269 N.E.2d at 903, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
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is a physical invasion, legal appropriation or legal restraint, the
effective date is certain. Less definable dates (such as the date on
which Clement decided was most prudent to relocate) are subject to
administrative problems of deciding whether a "taking" occurred.
Interest is proportional to the time of taking33 and is granted due to
the owner's relinquishment of use; when the owner vacated, did he
do so in good faith or did he vacate early in order to get a greater
amount of interest on his condemnation award?
Fewer administrative problems arise in awarding condemnation
blight compensation; no interest is included in the award because
condemnation blight goes only to the loss of value and not to the loss
of use. Therefore, as a matter of administration, courts will more
readily grant an award for blight than for a de facto taking.
The concept of just compensation developed in the nineteenth
century when the problems of urban redevelopment condemnations
were not a concern. Since much of the property taken in the 1800's
was undeveloped, owners incurred few losses not compensated by the
market value.34 Today the owner of a highly developed area may
have to relinquish much more than what a condemnor takes since
not all real losses are compensated under traditional theories. For
instance, as condemnation blight afflicts an area, sites within that
area may become essentially uninhabitable. Unless a legal inter-
ference by the government causes a de facto taking, however, the
legal fiction holds that the owner incurs no loss of use of his prop-
erty. For practical purposes he may not utilize his property, but for
legal purposes his dominion is unaltered. Societal standards of com-
pensation do not develop concurrently with new categories of injuries.
Real detriments such as loss of use, taxes, maintenance and insur-
ance expenses fell on Clement primarily due to reliance on the city's
actions. Notice in advance of appropriation and reliance on that
notice were business necessities for Clement in order to move its
massive equipment by the city's specified date. The element of sub-
jectivity in Clement's decision was minimal in light of the city's over-
bearing land-use prerogatives. Urban renewal projects are subject to
unforeseen delays, but it is of questionable equity to place the burden
33. See note 26 supra.
34. Spies & McCoid, Recovery of Consequential Damages in Eminent Domain,
48 VA. L. REv. 437, 442-43 (1962). See also Note, Eminent Domain Valuations
in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental Losses, 67 YALE L.J. 61, 65 (1957).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol1973/iss1/21
CONDEMNATION BLIGHT
of planning errors on companies whose reliance the city may have
induced.
Municipal authorities should be held to a stricter standard of care
to minimize the loss of land use. Secrecy in planning would be
undesirable,-5 but officials should be held to some degree of account-
ability. Incorrect planning advice by a city and subsequent stringent
compensation could undermine the city's image of legitimacy.36 Also,
insufficient settlements could arouse popular indignation and thereby
impede further redevelopment programs.37
With these considerations, the possibility of finding a de facto
taking should be examined seriously when a threat of condemnation
induces pragmatic reliance and the owner's abandonment was in
good faith.3,
Clement is important in that the court rigidly adhered to the tra-
ditional definition of de facto taking despite persuasive exigencies
suggesting an expansion of the concept. The decision goes beyond
the taking issue to the fundamental propriety of the city threatening
condemnation and promoting reliance. The condemnor was not held
directly accountable for the adverse effects of an induced abandon-
ment, while compensation was granted for that property market
value decline which was attributable to the government project.
Reliance was "necessary" for the company to comply with the city's
acquisition schedule as announced, but it was not legally "necessary;"
thus, a de facto taking was declared not to have occurred as a matter
of law.
William F. Greer, Jr.
35. Municipal covertness "'... would but raise [greater] havoc with an own-
er's rights.'" 28 N.Y.2d at 256, 269 N.E.2d at 904, 321 N.Y.S.2d at 358, citing
City of Buffalo v. J.W. Clement Co., 34 App. Div. 2d 24, 39, 311 N.Y.S.2d 98,
114 (1970) (Gabrielli, J., dissenting).
36. Comment, Never Trust a Bureaucrat: Estoppel Against the Government,
42 S. CAL. L. Rrv. 391, 403 (1969).
37. Note, Eminent Domain Valuations in an Age of Redevelopment: Incidental
Losses, 67 YALrE L.J. 61, 64, 92 (1957).
38. See Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALr L.J. 36 (1964). "The
formal appropriation or physical invasion theory should be rejected once and for
all." Id. at 48.
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